

# Effect of Money in Judicial Elections on Factor Productivity

Mayur Choudhary\*

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## Abstract

This paper studies the effect of campaign finance on judicial selection and industrial productivity. I exploit the variation across states in judicial selection procedures and campaign finance laws due to the Supreme Court's surprise verdict in the Citizens United v. FEC case in 2010, that rendered bans on independent expenditure in elections unconstitutional. Using a difference-in-differences framework, with states that imposed bans before the verdict as the treated states, I first confirm that the removal of such bans led to a 33% (\$ 200,000) increase in the average electoral expenditure of judicial candidates and increased electoral competition. Further, labor productivity measured as value added per worker increased by 8% in treated states with judicial elections. I find evidence that the productivity improvement is due to a reduction in contract enforcement frictions. For sectors more reliant on contract enforcement, labor productivity is higher in states with judicial elections.

*Keywords: Political Finance, Factor Productivity, Money in Politics, Judicial Elections, Contract Enforcement*

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# Introduction

Economic relationships between firms and workers, or suppliers and buyers are commonly governed through contracts. Contractual disputes are often adjudicated in a court of law, where a judge or a bench makes their verdict based on legal merit. Judicial procedures and the legal environment are crucial determinants of economic and financial development (North et al. (1990), Acemoglu, Gallego and Robinson (2014), Porta et al. (1998)). Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that the selection procedure for judges either through appointment by the legislature, or popular elections will shape the legal environment, and affect contractual decisions within the jurisdiction of such courts. Economic players, such as industry lobbies and trade unions may gain from influencing the judicial selection through monetary contributions, either in judicial elections or in the election of the appointing authority.

Election, as opposed to appointment by the executive or the legislative branch, is considered to be more democratic and less vulnerable to capture by an elite minority which may reduce distortions and improve productivity. However, the uncertainty associated with electoral outcomes, coupled with the reliance of judicial candidates on special interest donors for campaign finance could lead to unfair courts and subpar contract enforcement, which would then result in inefficient production. Whether the election of judges affects firm productivity positively or negatively is, therefore, an empirical question. In this paper, I ask, how different selection procedures and electoral finance affect the judicial bench composition and firm productivity.

I answer this question in the context of the state supreme courts (or high courts) in the United States.<sup>1</sup> I use the variation in selection procedures across different states within the same national constitutional framework. For variation in campaign finance, I exploit the plausibly exogenous treatment assignment due to the surprise Supreme Court ruling in the *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC)* case in 2010. This 5-4 (5 judges out of 9 ruled in favor of *Citizens United*) split ruling rendered bans on independent expenditures in elections imposed by some states unconstitutional. As a result, around

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<sup>1</sup>High Court and State Supreme Courts, both terms are used interchangeably to refer to the highest courts in the state judicial system.

23 states saw a lifting of bans from independent expenditures by corporations, unions, or both. Overall 22 states in the United States rely on judicial elections for the selection of judges to the high courts (State Supreme Courts) out of which 11 had instated such bans which got invalidated in 2010. To illustrate how campaign finance affects judicial selection and firm productivity, I begin by documenting the effect of the removal of such bans on judicial elections in a difference-in-differences research design. I consider the states where the bans on independent expenditure were lifted as the treated states and states without such bans that remain unaffected due to the Supreme Court ruling as control.

First, I confirm that the lifting of bans indeed leads to an increase in the average funding of judicial candidates by around \$200,000 in an election cycle. The corresponding increase in independent expenditures is similar in magnitude. The pre-treatment average funding of a candidate is approximately \$600,000. Therefore, the average increase in the funding relative to the pre-treatment period due to the removal of bans is 33%. I interpret the effect on direct electoral funding of candidates as driven by the increased competition for financing facilitated due to the removal of restrictions on independent electoral expenditures. Lower constraints on independent expenditures may increase competition for funding and the interest groups may donate more in order to compete. I document that a significant proportion of the increase in political funding is driven by business groups and political parties. The lawyers and lobbyists which are the single largest group donating to the judicial candidates, do not show an increase in expenditure implying that they may not have been constrained by the prior bans. Unions and other ideological groups also do not contribute more in response to the lifting of bans.

Second, I find that higher campaign finance increases competition in electoral races. The vote margin, or the victory margin of winning candidates declines by about 20% following the removal of bans. On the extensive margin, the number of candidates per seat increases by 35%, i.e. if earlier there were 3 candidates contesting in elections where 2 judicial seats are available, following the removal of bans there are 4 candidates per 2 seats. Therefore, unrestricted independent expenditure and competition for funds increase electoral competition due to more challengers emerging. Similarly, the incumbency advantage, i.e. the probability that an incumbent emerges as the victor in an electoral race declines by

20% following the removal of bans in races where there is at least one challenger and one incumbent. Therefore, incumbents seem to lose more often, and hence the turnover of judges increases. In terms of the bench composition, the dispersion in ideology, measured as the average absolute deviation from median bench ideology increases in treated states with judicial elections. This indicates that the judicial bench of the highest court is more ideologically diverse on account of the increased electoral competition.

Following the evidence on higher political expenditure and competition in judicial elections, I test whether the change in the legal environment due to the removal of campaign finance restrictions affects firm productivity. I particularly focus on labor productivity, measured as the value added per worker at the state-sector level from the American Survey of Manufacturers. A sector is defined at the 4-digit NAICS level. I find that labor productivity is 5% higher for treated states. I further show that this effect is mainly driven by manufacturing activity in states with judicial elections. The labor productivity in USD value added per worker is 8% higher in states with judicial elections when the bans on independent electoral expenditures are removed. These results are robust to measuring labor productivity as USD value added per hour of labor. Thus, I provide evidence linking less restrictive campaign finance in judicial elections to higher factor productivity. The results are robust to including sector-by-year fixed effects to account for time trends that affect the sectors differentially. The results are also robust to the inclusion of state-specific time trends to account for demand or industrial policy trends specific to each state.

I propose that the increase in productivity could be due to improved production efficiency. To test for increased production efficiency, I test whether employment and capital expenditure growth rates are higher in treated states. I find a 17% increase in employment growth and 64% increase in capital expenditure growth rate. Second, I also test whether the production process becomes more efficient in the utilization of material input. The shipment per unit material cost increases by 22% in treated states with judicial elections.

Alternatively, higher labor productivity could be due to a reduction in employment in treated states because firms find it easier to fire workers. I test whether the employment termination frictions have eased for the firms due to the decline in the collective bargaining power of the workers. Note that if the employment termination frictions have eased

then employment growth rates should decline in the treated states with judicial elections. Rather, I find evidence that indicates an increase in employment. The ability of corporations to spend more on judicial elections could also result in weaker collective bargaining power of the unions. In this case, we may expect that the wage rates in treated states should have declined. I proxy for the average wage rate as the ratio of the total wage bill and the number of employees. I find that the change in the wage rate is neither statistically nor economically significant. Therefore, the improvement in labor productivity is not driven by changes in the collective bargaining power of the workers on account of the variation in campaign finance in states with or without judicial elections.

To highlight the mechanism behind the improved production efficiency, I test whether the production efficiency is driven by sectors that are more reliant on contract enforcement for their production process. I use a measure of sector-specific supplier concentration, as in Levchenko (2007) to distinguish between sectors more and less reliant on contract enforcement. The rationale behind the measure is that production technology is institutionally dependent if the risk of expropriation by input suppliers is higher, as it would be when the Herfindahl Index of supplier concentration is lower. I use the input-output matrix data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis that provides information on supplier relationships between various sectors. I find that labor productivity increases after the removal of bans on independent expenditure in judicial election states for sectors more reliant on contract enforcement, indicating a decline in contractual frictions. There is no effect on the productivity of contractually intensive sectors in the states without judicial elections. I also find evidence supporting the improvements in production efficiency for such sectors in the form of increased capital expenditure and employment growth rates, and higher revenue as a fraction of input costs.

Finally, as a robustness check, I test whether the sector-level improvements in factor productivity also hold at the firm level. I rely on the National Establishments Time Series (NETS) data and focus on the sample of standalone firms to abstract from reallocation within firms across states. I show that the average within firm productivity (revenue per employee) is higher due to the removal of bans in states with judicial elections. Although the average firm productivity is higher due to the changes in the legal institutions, however,

this may still lead to increased factor misallocation along the lines of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Sraer and Thesmar (2023). I find no evidence supporting increased misallocation because the dispersion of productivity is lower, however statistically insignificant for treated states with judicial elections. Moreover, the covariance between labor productivity and revenue, a measure of whether the gains in productivity are higher for larger firms is also lower and statistically insignificant, indicating that the production efficiency gains do not come at the cost of increased misallocation.

In summary, this paper highlights a novel channel through which campaign finance affects factor productivity. Particularly, following the removal of bans on independent expenditures, the campaign expenditure and competition in judicial elections increased. The effect of such bans on the ideological composition of the judicial bench depends on whether the judges are elected or appointed by the legislative or the executive branch. Labor productivity increases only in states with judicial elections, which also experience an increase in the ideological diversity of the judicial bench. The labor productivity increase is due to improvements in production efficiency, and a reduction in contract enforcement frictions. I abstract from the welfare consequences of such a less restrictive campaign finance policy but emphasize that reducing constraints on political expenditures improves factor productivity, particularly in states where the selection procedure for judges is more democratic and less immune to capture by a minority coalition.

**Related Literature:** This paper is most closely related to the literature that studies the effect of institutions on growth and productivity, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005), Porta et al. (1998), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014), and Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2010). These studies rely on cross-country variation in laws and the institutions that enforce them. I add to this literature by highlighting the importance of judicial selection procedures and less constrained campaign finance laws for the legal environment, and industrial productivity. Other papers in this literature have focused on the contract-enforcement intensity and its effect on financial development, Brown, Cookson and Heimer (2017), and Cookson (2018). I exploit a similar variation in institutional intensity however the difference arises due to the election of judges, and the importance of electoral finance

in competitive elections. Other scholars in this literature have also documented a link between within-country contract-enforcement intensity and the choice of production process Boehm and Oberfield (2020), and cross-country legal reform and labor productivity Chemin (2020). In line with this literature, I highlight a novel channel, i.e. the election of judiciary accompanied by less constrained campaign finance laws, through which the productivity of institutionally dependent sectors is positively affected.

This paper is also related to the literature that relies on the *Citizens United v. FEC* ruling for identifying the effect of increased political expenditure on various economic variables of interest. The papers in this literature most closely related are Akey et al. (2022), Denes, Scanlon and Schulz (2022), and Klumpp, Mialon and Williams (2016). Akey et al. (2022) highlights the democratizing effect of the ruling, and how broader political participation leads to higher labor income. This paper, on the other hand, studies the effect on production efficiency of such a campaign finance reform and how it depends on the judicial selection procedure. Denes, Scanlon and Schulz (2022) highlight the rise of dark money pools following the ruling, Klumpp, Mialon and Williams (2016) highlight how the ruling has led to higher turnover, and increased expenditure in political races. This paper replicates some of these facts in the context of judicial races to show that political expenditures have increased, and electoral races have become more competitive, accompanied by shifts in the ideology of the judicial bench. Other papers in this literature focus on the likelihood of certain laws being enacted, such as Slattery, Tazhitdinova and Robinson (2023) for state taxes, and Werner and Coleman (2015) for anti-takeover laws. This paper highlights how sectors more reliant on contract enforcement may become more productive due to increased competition in judicial races and a more ideologically diverse judicial bench.

The paper also contributes to the literature that studies misallocation due to political frictions Fisman (2001), Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006), Haselmann, Schoenherr and Vig (2018). The key insight from this literature is how politically connected elites may distort resource allocation. In this paper, I focus on the judicial frictions that may affect firms reliant on contract enforcement. I find that political interventions that increase political expenditure may increase electoral competition and increase factor productivity, particularly in states where the judiciary is elected. Moreover, the within-sector dispersion

of productivity, a measure of factor misallocation does not increase along the lines of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and Larrain and Stumpner (2017). I use a difference-in-differences approach to quantify the misallocation as in Sraer and Thesmar (2023), and document that the improved productivity does not come at the expense of higher factor misallocation.

The paper is organized as follows. I begin with a discussion of the institutional background and research design and argue the plausible exogeneity of the treatment assignment. The following couple of sections document the effect on judicial elections and electoral expenditures of judicial candidates. I then present the main results, followed by evidence of the heterogeneity across sectors and suggestive mechanisms before concluding.

## **1 Institutional Background**

### **1.1 State Supreme Court Selection**

The judicial system in the United States is unique such that several state high courts and appellate court judges are elected. Overall 22 states undertake elections to fill up the bench of their judicial high courts (also referred to as state supreme courts). Figure (1) illustrates the geographic spread of states and how they are not concentrated within a specific geographic region. The remaining 38 states follow some form of variant of appointment. Either the judges are appointed by the governor, the state legislatures, or through a merit plan. Table (1) (reproduced here in the Appendix Figure (23)) from Kang and Shepherd (2015) provides details regarding the state procedures for selection of judges.

Among the states that do hold elections, the judge tenures differ. While in a majority of states the judges must go for retention election every 6 years, some states have tenures as long as 8 or 10 years. Most states go for judicial elections either for an open seat, i.e. elections without incumbents where the incumbent has retired or has died, or a general election in even years. A few states such as Pennsylvania (exclusively in odd-numbered years), Louisiana, and Wisconsin go for elections in odd-numbered years. The judges incumbents, and challengers raise funds for their election bid and use these funds to raise awareness about their ideological position. Figure (22) provides an illustration of an advertisement favoring candidate Janet Protasiewicz by Planned Parenthood, an ideological group in the



**Judicial Election**




Figure 1: States with elections for the Supreme Courts in **Grey**. 22 states have judicial elections.

Wisconsin State Supreme Court elections of 2023.

Some of the states had imposed bans on independent expenditures by corporations and/or unions. However, in January 2010, in the case of *Citizens United vs. the FEC*, the Supreme Court of the United States deemed such bans imposed as unconstitutional. Following this ruling, such political actors in these states were subjected to more relaxed funding constraints as now interest groups, corporations, and unions could spend unlimited sums on attacking or favoring a candidate without disclosures. In Figure (2), I focus on states with judicial elections that had imposed bans on independent expenditure, and which are considered as treated in our research design. States where such bans were placed in general are illustrated in Figure (25) in the online appendix. There is an additional difference in the electoral procedure for judiciary selection, such that some election states allow the party of the judge to be on the ballot, whereas others do not. The former are termed partisan election states and the latter the non-partisan election states. Legal scholars such as Kang and Shepherd (2015) have shown that this distinction is important in understanding how the political funding and influence operate in the judicial elections. Figure (26) in the Online Appendix provides information about the partisan and non-partisan states. Overall there are 11 states out of the 22 with judicial elections that have partisan elections, out of which 6 are treated. Among the states with non-partisan elections, 5 are treated.

## 2 Research Design and Data

### 2.1 Research Design

For simplicity consider two periods  $t \in \{0, 1\}$  and two states  $s \in \{T, C\}$  with multiple sectors of firms operating within each state. There is an intervention that affects state (and firms within these states)  $T$ , the treated states. The other state is the control state  $C$  which is not affected by the treatment. Define the across time and within state-sector differences by  $\Delta_t$ , so that

$$\Delta_t(y_{js}) = (y_{js1} - y_{js0})$$

### Judicial Elections




Figure 2: States that imposed some form of ban on independent expenditure are highlighted in blue and green. States with judicial elections, but no bans are in grey. States without judicial elections and no bans are in white.

The  $2 \times 2$  DD estimand for sector  $j$  is,

$$D_j = \Delta_t(y_{jT}) - \Delta_t(y_{jC}) = (y_{jT1} - y_{jC1}) - (y_{jT0} - y_{jC0})$$

Suppose the counterfactual level of the dependent variable in the treated state  $T$  in the absence of the treatment was  $y_{jT1}^0$ . Taking average across sectors  $j \in J$ ,

$$E[D_j] = \underbrace{E[y_{jT1} - y_{jT1}^0]}_{ATE_T} + E[y_{jT1}^0 - y_{jC1}] - E[y_{jT0} - y_{jC0}] \quad (1)$$

Imposing the parallel-trends assumption that the distortion in the treated state would have evolved parallel to that in the control state.

$$E[y_{jT1}^0 - y_{jC1}] = E[y_{jT0} - y_{jC0}]$$

I can estimate the ATT of an intervention that affects the firms in certain states. Notice that the treatment effect could be heterogeneous effects across sectors.

The United States (US) offers a unique setting to study the effect of campaign finance on the judiciary and factor productivity. A total of 22 states in the US use elections to appoint judges to the highest state courts. The remaining 38 use some form of governor, or state-legislature appointment. Moreover, there were strict campaign finance restrictions imposed in around 23 states that banned independent expenditures from either the corporations or both corporations and unions. These restrictions were deemed unconstitutional following the 2010 Citizens United vs. FEC ruling by the Supreme Court of the US. This decision was unanticipated with a 5-4 split decision and led to larger sums of money flowing into the electoral races for different state and federal offices, particularly for states where bans were imposed initially.

I treat this intervention by the US Supreme Court and the states affected by this intervention as the treated states. The period following 2010, is considered as the post-period in our simple  $2 \times 2$  DD research design. In this paper, I intend to focus on the effect of campaign finance laws on the judiciary, therefore I focus on states with judicial elections. In Table (1), I provide regression evidence that the treatment assignment, i.e. lifting of bans ( $ban = 1$ ) or the lifting of bans in states with judicial elections ( $elect \times ban = 1$ ) is

uncorrelated with the scale of operations of firms, i.e. capital expenditure and employment. Further, I show that the productivity-related measures such as the wage, labor productivity, and marginal revenue product of labor are also on average not statistically significant across treated and control groups. In the Appendix in Table (12) I provide evidence that the treatment assignment is uncorrelated on observables. Figures (18) and (17) show that the firms in the treated and control states follow similar pre-trends. This is further confirmed in the dynamic event-study specifications discussed along with the regression evidence.

Table 1: Pre-Treatment Difference

Note: This table presents the evidence for the absence of pre-treatment selection. The table shows the regression of economic outcome variables on the indicators for states with judicial elections for the state Supreme Court judges, and states with bans on independent expenditure invalidated by the 2010 Citizens United v. FEC ruling and their interaction for the pre-treatment period 2003-2009. All regressions include year fixed effects to account for aggregate economic shocks and 4-digit NAICS sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	log(CapEx)	log(Emp.)	Wage	Lab. Prod.	Lab. Prod.
			('000 USD)	('000 USD/emp)	('000 USD/hr)
Election	0.27 (0.33)	0.15 (0.15)	0.05 (0.84)	12.78 (19.10)	4.94 (8.59)
Ban	0.21 (0.32)	0.02 (0.15)	0.57 (0.91)	14.19 (11.72)	6.13 (5.95)
Elect $\times$ Ban	0.37 (0.46)	0.28 (0.21)	0.09 (1.19)	-18.69 (23.04)	-8.20 (10.64)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sector FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	11,499	11,499	10,998	11,089	11,071
R-sq.	0.22	0.35	0.54	0.41	0.40

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## 2.2 Data

I combine data from several sources. The data on political funding, judicial elections, judge ideology, and state-sector-level real outcomes come from different sources. I briefly describe the sources of data. The exact procedure for subsetting and combining the data are mentioned in the Online Appendix.

### 2.2.1 Political Funding Data

Election data is from the National institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP, OpenSecrets.org). The data sample for the financing of state high court judges comprises years 2000-2022. There is data for some state races (including high court judges) going back up to 1989, however NIMSP started collecting data for all 50 states only since 2000.<sup>2</sup> The independent expenditure data has limited coverage. Available for 13 states with robust disclosure requirements from 2006-2022. Figure 27 in the online appendix provides an illustration of the lack of funding data availability before 2000, where it is clear that over 50% of the states going for high court judge elections had no funding data.

### 2.2.2 Judicial Elections and Judge Ideology Data

Several judicial scholars have painstakingly collected and compiled data on judicial elections. In this paper, I use the most up-to-date and comprehensive source of this information from Kritzer (2015). This dataset provides information on all judicial elections from 1946 until 2020. The dataset contains the identity of the candidates, the votes received, the type of election, number of seats being contested.

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<sup>2</sup>See the disclosure from NIMSP available at <https://www.followthemoney.org/help/q-and-a> :  
“The institute has contributions data for candidates running for state office in all 50 states since 2000 (though data for some state races extends back to 1989). I began collecting ballot measure contributions data in 2004, and independent spending data for some state elections in 2006. I recently added contributions data for candidates running for federal office, and some local offices beginning in 2011-2012.”

Political scientists have designed several measures to arrive at the judicial positions of judges. Of important note are three measures of judge ideology. The first Public Assisted Judge Ideology (PAJID) from Brace, Langer and Hall (2000) relies on the electorate’s ideological position at the time of election, the common-space CFScore compiled by Bonica and Woodruff (2015) relies on the political donation by judges, and the WHH score which combines elements of the common-space approach with judicial decisions Windett, Harden and Hall (2015). In this paper, I use the data from Wilhelm, Vining and Hughes (2023) which provides the replication of PAJID measures from 1979-2020. They also compile the CFScore from Bonica and Woodruff (2015) which is available until 2015.

### **2.2.3 Manufacturing Census Data**

I rely on the manufacturing census data collected as part of the American Survey of Manufacturers compiled by the Census Bureau. I do not have access to the plant-level data which requires sworn status, I rely on the state-sector level aggregates on capital expenditure, shipments, wage-bill, capital expenditure, value-added for computations of labor productivity.

### **2.2.4 Other Data**

I also make use of other public sources of data such as state election commissions for gubernatorial election races, the input-output data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to compile the measure of sector-level contract-reliance. As a robustness I also use the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) to provide firm-level evidence of resource misallocation due to campaign finance.

## **3 Judicial Elections and Competition**

### **3.1 Judicial Funding: Key Facts**

The funding in judicial elections is classified by NweMSP into several categories depending on the disclosure by the donors. As is clear, the single largest contributions come from the lawyers and lobbyists (NIMSP classification). A significant proportion of funding in

the elections is somewhat opaque and hard to assign into a category. Such donations are assigned as unassigned. When I consolidate the donations from different business interests, such donations are the leading source of funding for judges competing in elections and amount to a total of \$125 MM for elections from 2000-2021. Political parties have donated around \$50 MM. The unions and ideological groups have donated roughly \$50 MM. I hold the view that different groups compete for access with the judges, and this point of view is corroborated in Table (15) in the Appendix, where I show that the funding from different sources shows significant correlations within elections. Note that the two categories most strongly correlated with the unassigned contributions are contributions from parties and self-funding of candidates, and the donations from business groups.




Figure 3: Funding of Judicial Candidates from different Donor Categories

The bans were lifted from independent expenditures. Our hypothesis is that the relaxation of such funding constraints would lead to increased competition for funds in electoral races, and therefore a higher amount of average funding of a candidate in judicial elections. Note that, as Figure (20) suggests the funding is generally quite skewed, and the average funding of a candidate is around \$400,000. One would expect that if the removal of such bans increases competition for funding, then the total electoral funding should increase. This is what I see in Figure (4). The average funding in elections in states where the bans were removed (Treated) is higher after 2010. Note that I have not taken into account the state-specific factors such as state income, and traditional ideological position. In the following sections, I adopt the difference-in-differences framework to analyze the effect of the



Supreme Court ruling on judicial competition for funds, electoral competition, and finally sector-level resource misallocation.




Figure 4: Average funding in USD for judicial elections in Treated vs. Control States

### 3.2 Judicial Funding: Effect due to Removal of Bans

in this section, I test whether the lifting of bans on independent expenditures increased funding of judicial candidates. I run the following regression specification.

$$y_{ist} = \delta_s + \lambda_t + \beta \cdot Treat_s \times Post_t + \mathbf{X}'_{ist} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (2)$$

in the regression specification  $y_{ist} \in \{fund_{ist}, indep_{ist}\}$  for candidate  $i$ , in state  $s$  and time  $t$ ,  $Treat_s = \mathbb{1}(\text{State imposed ban on independent expenditure})$ ,  $Post = \mathbb{1}(t \geq 2010)$ ,  $X_{ist}$  are state-level and individual-level controls such as income, demographic characteristics such as education, election type (open vs. retention). I consider both cases, allowing for time-varying controls and restricting control variables to the year 2010 (Treatment year). The ban removal robustly increases the average funding of judges.  $\{\delta_s, \lambda_t\}$  are state and

time fixed-effects. I present the DD estimates for the average treatment effect on the funding and independent expenditures in Table (2). The average increase in funding due to the removal of bans is nearly \$200,000, and the increase is similar for independent expenditures. Controlling for time-invariant state characteristics such as their geography, ideological leanings, etc. leads to an increase in the average treatment effect magnitude.

Table 2: Effect on Political Finance of Judges

Note: This table presents the estimation results of Equation (2). The dependent variable is the total expenditure by a candidate in the judicial elections, measured in USD MM. Variable *Ban* indicates the states that had imposed a ban on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. The specifications in each column vary depending on the inclusion of state, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Fund (in MM)	Fund (in MM)	Ind. Exp. (in MM)	Ind. Exp. (in MM)
Post	-0.39*** (0.11)		-0.15 (0.26)	
Ban	-0.02 (0.15)		-0.07 (0.08)	
Ban × Post	0.18* (0.10)	0.22** (0.10)	-0.16 (0.34)	0.30** (0.13)
Election Cycle FE	N	Y	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	N	Y
N	1,227	1,227	251	251
R-sq.	0.08	0.27	0.13	0.36

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

I can also examine the dynamic effects of the Supreme court ruling on the funding of representatives in elections. I estimate the following regression equation,

$$y_{ist} = \delta_s + \lambda_t + \sum_{\tau=-5}^6 \beta_{\tau} \cdot Treat_s \times D_{t-\tau} + \varepsilon_{ist} \quad (3)$$

I set  $\beta_0 = 0$ . That is the comparisons in the change in funding across treated and control states take the 2010 cycle as the baseline. Inspecting Figure (5) I infer that the difference in funding in the years before 2010, is not significantly distinct from the difference in 2010. However, after the Supreme Court ruling, there seems to be an increase in the funding in treated states compared to the control states.

I see that the political funding of candidates increased on average following the lifting

*Note:* This figure presents the estimation results of Equation (3). The dependent variable is the political expenditure by a judicial candidate, measured in USD MM. The figures indicate the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals that illustrate the dynamic effects on labor productivity due to the lifting of the bans imposed on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Event Time, 0 is the year 2010. All estimations include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the state.




Figure 5: Event study plots. Event time is the 2010-2011 election cycle.

Table 3: Effect on Funding (Categorized)

Note: This table presents the estimation results of Equation (2). The dependent variable is the total expenditure by a candidate in the judicial elections, measured in USD MM. Different columns shows results for estimation with the dependent variable as the political expenditure in an election by a candidate from a particular source, such as business, unions, or political parties. Column (3) shows the results for expenditure items that could not be assigned to a particular source. Variable *Ban* indicates the states that had imposed a ban on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. The specifications in each column vary depending on the inclusion of state, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Business	Party and Cand.	Unassigned	Lawyers and Lobbyists	Union and other
Ban $\times$ Post	0.08*	0.08**	0.07**	-0.04	-0.00
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Election Cycle FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	1,070	1,070	1,070	1,070	1,070
R-sq.	0.21	0.16	0.32	0.21	0.17

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$


of bans on independent expenditures. It is interesting to understand which funding sources contribute to this rise. Table (3) shows that the increase in political funding is mainly driven by funding from businesses, and political parties (and unassigned groups). Interestingly, lawyers and lobbyists which is one of the main sources of funding for the judicial candidates are not affected by the Supreme Court ruling, as they were not constrained to begin with. Moreover, unions and other ideological groups do not seem to be affected by the supreme court ruling either, at least in the states with judicial elections. Figure (6) provides further credible evidence regarding the change in funding from different sources. In the appendix, I exploit the heterogeneity in the pre-existing bans, i.e. corporations-only bans vs. corporations and unions bans to show how a higher competition among various interest groups is a likely reason behind increased political expenditure in judicial elections after the 2010 Supreme Court ruling.

### 3.3 Competitiveness of Election Races


in this section, I document that the competitiveness of elections increases due to unrestricted campaign finance. I run the same regression specification as Equation (2) replacing  $y_{ist}$  with election level dependent variable in each election  $i$  in state  $s$  in election cycle  $t$ . The dependent variables that I focus on are the vote margin of the victors and the number of candidates competing in an election. Since, there could be many races in which only one candidate (incumbent) runs for election, and some elections where there are no incumbents (elections for open seats), I control for the election type fixed effect in our regression to account for such differences. The average treatment effect on the number of challengers in an election race is positive, i.e. as the limits on independent expenditure are relaxed the election races become more competitive due to the number of challengers in the race. In particular, if earlier there were 3 candidates competing for 2 judicial seats, after the removal of bans there are 2 candidates per seat.

The second piece of evidence, regarding the vote margin implies that there is a 15% reduction in the vote margin of the victors. Therefore, the electoral races have become more


*Note:* This figure presents the estimation results of Equation (3). The dependent variable is the political expenditure by a judicial candidate, measured in USD MM from various sources such as Business groups in Panel (a), Party and self-funding from candidates in Panel (b), and funding from unions and other special interest groups in Panel (c). The figures indicate the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals that illustrate the dynamic effects on labor productivity due to the lifting of the bans imposed on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Event Time, 0 is the year 2010. All estimations include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the state.



(a) Funding Business



(b) Funding Party & Candidate



(c) Funding Unions & other

Figure 6: Event Study of Funding of Judicial Candidates from Different Donor Categories

Table 4: Electoral Competition

Note: This table presents the estimation results of Equation (2). The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is the percentage difference in votes of the winner and the closest losing rival. Columns (3) and (4) show the results with the number of candidates per seat in judicial elections as the dependent variable. Variable *Ban* indicates the states that had imposed a ban on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. The specifications in each column vary depending on the inclusion of state, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	vote margin	vote margin	no. of cand.	no. of cand.
Ban $\times$ Post	-0.16** (0.06)	-0.15** (0.06)	0.57** (0.23)	0.57** (0.26)
Election Cycle FE	N	Y	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	N	Y
N	638	638	675	675
R-sq.	0.14	0.33	0.29	0.41

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

competitive after the relaxation of funding restrictions by the Supreme Court ruling. In the appendix in Figure (??) I show the dynamic effect of the Supreme Court ruling on the number of candidates per seat and the vote margin at the election level. The third piece of evidence, included in the appendix, deals with the competitive advantage of incumbents in judicial elections. I show that the probability that an incumbent wins the election declines by 20% following the Supreme Court ruling.

### 3.4 Effect on Judge Ideology

The increase in political finance also may have implications for the judicial selection. In this section, I focus on the shift in ideology of the bench, and in particular the median ideology to show how unrestricted campaign finance may have implications for how the cases are viewed by the highest bench of the state judiciary. I focus on the Party Adjusted Judge Ideology (PAJID) from Brace, Langer and Hall (2000). This score relies on the ideology of the electorate when assigning an ideology score to the elected judges. This score does a decent job of predicting how the bench may make decisions, and also highlights how the composition of the bench may start to change over time due to campaign finance.

First, in Figure (7) I show that there is not a significant difference in the pre-period ideology of the bench in the treated vs. control states. I then run the regression specification in Equation (2) with the dependent variable being the median bench ideology, the mean bench ideology, and the standard deviation of the bench ideology (a measure of polarization). The ideology score lies in the range of  $[0, 100]$  with a higher number associated with liberal-leaning judges. The results are in Table (5) and I see that there is a shift in the ideology of the bench with the median, mean and polarization increasing for the treated states. A similar pattern holds in an event study design. The results are in the Figure (8).

I estimate the following regression equation,

$$y_{st} = \delta_s + \delta_t + \beta_{ep} \cdot (Elect \times Post) + \beta_{bp} \cdot (Ban \times Post) + \beta_{ebp} \cdot (Elect \times Ban \times Post) + \varepsilon_{st} \quad (4)$$

To quantify the dynamic effect of the removal of bans on independent expenditure, I estimate the following event-study design equation where  $D_t$  is an indicator variable for year  $t$ , relative to the treatment year 2010.






Figure 7: Judge Ideology

Table 5: Effect on Ideology (PAJID)

Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (4). Columns (1)-(2) show results with median ideology (PAJID score) of the judicial bench, which takes values in (0, 100), with higher values indicating a more liberal ideology of a given state  $s$  in year  $t$  as the dependent variables. Columns (3)-(4) show results with the mean absolute deviation from the median ideology (PAJID score) of the judicial bench, which takes values in (0, 100), with higher values indicating a more liberal ideology of a given state  $s$  in year  $t$  as the dependent variable. Variables *Elect* indicates states with judicial elections for state supreme court judges, *Ban* indicates the states that had imposed a ban on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Variable *Contract* indicates sectors with high reliance on contract enforcement. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	log(med. idlgy)	log(med. idlgy)	log(abs dev. idlgy)	log(abs dev. idlgy)
Ban × Post	0.10 (0.07)		0.17 (0.15)	
Elect × Ban × Post	0.01 (0.08)	0.10** (0.04)	0.02 (0.18)	0.20** (0.09)
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	750	750	748	748
R-sq.	0.89	0.89	0.84	0.84

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

$$y_{st} = \delta_s + \delta_t + \sum_{\tau=-5}^T \beta_{\tau} \cdot Ban_s \times D_{t-\tau} + \varepsilon_{st} \quad (5)$$

*Note:* This figure presents the estimation results of equation (5). The dependent variable is median ideology (PAJID score) of the judicial bench, which takes values in (0,100), with higher values indicating a more liberal ideology for a given state  $s$  in year  $t$ . Panel (a) shows results for states with judicial elections for state Supreme Court judges and Panel (b) for states that use some form of appointment. The figures indicate the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals that illustrate the dynamic effects on ideology due to the lifting of the bans imposed on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Event Time, 0 is the year 2010. All estimations include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.




Figure 8: Effect on Median Judicial Bench Ideology (PAJID) Brace, Langer and Hall (2000)

## 4 Main Result

In this section, I test whether judicial elections along with the removal of bans on independent expenditures affect labor productivity. I measure labor productivity as the total value added in USD per worker. I estimate the following regression specification,

$$y_{jst} = \beta_{eb} \cdot (\text{Elect}_s \times \text{Post}_t) + \beta_{bp} \cdot (\text{Ban}_s \times \text{Post}_t) + \beta_{ebp} \cdot (\text{Elect}_s \times \text{Ban}_s \times \text{Post}_t) + \delta_s + \delta_{jt} + \beta_{ST} \cdot (s \times t) + \varepsilon_{jst} \quad (6)$$

where  $y_{jst}$  represents a quantity of interest for 4-digit NAICS sector  $j$  in state  $s$  at time  $t$ .  $\delta_i$  for  $i \in \{j, s, t\}$  are sector, state and time fixed effects. I also allow for state and sector-specific time trends. Table (6) illustrates the effect of the Supreme Court ruling invalidating

*Note:* This figure presents the estimation results of equation (5). The dependent variable is the mean absolute deviation from the median ideology (PAJID score) of the judicial bench, which takes values in (0, 100), with higher values indicating a more liberal ideology for a given state  $s$  in year  $t$ . Panel (a) shows results for states with judicial elections for state Supreme Court judges and Panel (b) for states that use some form of appointment. The figures indicate the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals that illustrate the dynamic effects on bench ideology due to the lifting of the bans imposed on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Event Time, 0 is the year 2010. All estimations include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.




Figure 9: Effect on Absolute deviation from the Median Judicial Bench Ideology (PAJID) Brace, Langer and Hall (2000)

bans placed on independent expenditures in elections on labor productivity. Column (1) shows that labor productivity increases by \$13 thousand per worker in treated states. We control for state-sector specific factors such as suitability of geographic conditions by a more restrictive state-by-sector fixed effect, which also accounts for global time-invariant cross-sectional differences in productivity across different states and sectors. We control for sector-specific time trends by a sector-by-year fixed effect. Column (2) and (3) show the heterogeneous effect in judicial election and non-election states, and that the within sector productivity increases significantly in states with judicial elections after the removal of bans on independent expenditures. Column (4) shows that the results are robust to the inclusion of state-by-sector fixed effect to account for time-invariant factors that may lead to assortative matching between states and sectors, such as state constitution and geographic features. Column (5) illustrates that the effect on productivity is robust to the inclusion of state-specific linear time trends indicating that the effect on productivity is not picking up differential productivity trends across the states.

Table 6: Effect on Labor Productivity (USD/emp)

Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (6) The dependent variable is labor productivity, measured as value added in USD 1000s per worker. Variables *Elect* indicates states with judicial elections for state supreme court judges, *Ban* indicates the states that had imposed a ban on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. The specifications in each column vary depending on the inclusion of state-by-sector, and sector-by-year fixed effects. Sector is defined at the 4-digit NAICS code level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Lab Prod (USD/emp)	Lab Prod (USD/emp)	Lab Prod (USD/emp)	Lab Prod (USD/emp)	Lab Prod (USD/emp)
Ban $\times$ Post	13.15* (6.60)	-25.88* (13.36)			
Elect $\times$ Ban $\times$ Post		66.30*** (23.13)	40.35** (18.40)	21.32** (9.42)	21.32** (10.48)
State FE	-	Y	Y	-	-
State $\times$ Sector FE	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Sector $\times$ Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trend	N	N	N	N	Y
N	38,536	38,688	38,688	38,536	38,536
R-sq.	0.71	0.39	0.39	0.71	0.71

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

We verify that the labor productivity increase is not driven by more intensive utilization of the labor force. In Table (7), we show that the increase in productivity measured as value added per hour of labor also increases and the growth percentages are as documented

in Table (6) for valued added per worker.

Table 7: Effect on Labor Productivity (USD/hr)

Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (6) The dependent variable is labor productivity, measured in USD value added per hour. Variables *Elect* indicates states with judicial elections for state supreme court judges, *Ban* indicates the states that had imposed a ban on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. The specifications in each column vary depending on the inclusion of state-by-sector, and sector-by-year fixed effects. Sector is defined at the 4-digit NAICS code level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Lab Prod (USD/hr)	Lab Prod (USD/hr)	Lab Prod (USD/hr)	Lab Prod (USD/hr)	Lab Prod (USD/hr)
Ban $\times$ Post	7.83** (3.36)	-12.55* (6.70)			
Elect $\times$ Ban $\times$ Post		34.33*** (11.84)	21.74** (9.56)	12.17** (5.00)	10.25* (5.32)
State FE	-	Y	Y	-	-
State $\times$ Sector FE	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Sector $\times$ Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trend	N	N	N	N	Y
N	39,469	39,593	39,593	39,469	39,469
R-sq.	0.69	0.37	0.37	0.69	0.69

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## 4.1 Effect on Investment and Employment

The increase in labor productivity may be due to the firms facing lower employee termination costs, due to decline in the collective bargaining power of workers. It could also be due to higher factor productivity in the treated states. Moreover, if production efficiency due to better enforcement of contracts with suppliers is at play, then the revenue per unit cost of input materials should be higher. If the reduction of contractual frictions is the cause of increased productivity, then we should observe a rise in the human and physical capital growth rates, i.e. the growth rate of capital expenditure and production workers should be higher. Moreover, if the bargaining power of the workers is lower, the wages should be lower. In Table (8), Columns (1) through (3) provide evidence for the higher productivity gains for sectors in states with judicial elections. Column (4) shows the estimation with the average wage, i.e. the total wage bill divided by the number of employees, as the depen-

dent variable. If the collective bargaining power of the workers is lower we would expect a decline in the wage rates. However, we observe an increase which is statistically and economically insignificant. All results in Table (8) are robust to the inclusion of state-specific time trends.

Table 8: Effect on Capital Expenditure, Employment, and Wages

Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (6) The dependent variable is logarithm of Capital Expenditure, measured in USD 1000s, Employment, Revenue per dollar of material input costs and Wage measured in USD 1000 per worker. Variables *Elect* indicates states with judicial elections for state supreme court judges, *Ban* indicates the states that had imposed a ban on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. All regressions include state, sector-by-year fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Sector is defined at the 4-digit NAICS code level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	log(CapEx)	log(Emp)	Rev/Mat Cost	Wage
				('000 USD/emp)
Elect × Ban × Post	0.64**	0.17**	0.22***	0.89
	(0.25)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.71)
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sector × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trend	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	38,688	38,688	34,877	38,688
R-sq.	0.39	0.66	0.42	0.48

Standard errors in parentheses


\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## 4.2 Dynamic Effect on Labor Productivity

The effect on labor productivity could be due to differential trends in the pre-period. The effect of the removal of ban estimated in Equation (6) is going to be biased if there are pre-period differential trends in labor productivity. In order to verify whether there are pre-period trends we estimate the following dynamic event-study specification where  $D_t$  is the indicator for the year relative to 2010, the year of the Supreme Court ruling. Figure (10) provides evidence that there are no pre-period trends in labor productivity and the difference between the productivity across states where the bans were lifted and where the ruling had no change in campaign finance laws is not significantly different than the difference in the year 2010. Panel (a) illustrates the increase in productivity for states with judicial elections, and Panel (b) shows that there is no effect on labor productivity in states where judges to the high court are selected through legislative or executive appointment. Figure (11) shows that the results also hold for productivity measured as value added per hour of labor.

$$y_{jst} = \delta_{sj} + \delta_{jt} + \sum_{\tau=-5}^T \beta_{\tau} \cdot Ban_s \times D_{t-\tau} + \varepsilon_{jst} \quad (7)$$

*Note:* This figure presents the estimation results of equation (7). The dependent variable is labor productivity, measured as value added in USD 1000 per employee. Panel (a) shows results for states with judicial elections for state Supreme Court judges and Panel (b) for states that use some form of appointment. The figures indicate the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals that illustrate the dynamic effects on labor productivity due to the lifting of the bans imposed on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Event Time, 0 is the year 2010. All estimations include state and sector-by-year fixed effects. Sector is defined at the 4-digit NAICS code level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.



(a) States With Judicial Elections

(b) States Without Judicial Elections

Figure 10: Effect on Labor Productivity in '000 USD /emp



*Note:* This figure presents the estimation results of equation (7). The dependent variable is labor productivity, measured as USD value added per hour. Panel (a) shows results for states with judicial elections for state Supreme Court judges and Panel (b) for states that use some form of appointment. The figures indicate the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals that illustrate the dynamic effects on labor productivity due to the lifting of the bans imposed on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Event Time, 0 is the year 2010. All estimations include state and sector-by-year fixed effects. Sector is defined at the 4-digit NAICS code level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.




Figure 11: Effect on Labor Productivity in USD /hr

## 5 Contract Reliance

I have documented that there has been an increase in sector-level labor productivity after the ruling in 2010. This effect is driven by sectors in states with judicial elections. So far, I have assumed that the treatment effect is homogeneous across sectors. However, one may expect that sectors more reliant on legal institutions for contract enforcement experience a more pronounced effect of more money in judicial politics. To create a measure of contract reliance, I rely on the methodology in Levchenko (2007). The measure is based on the input specificity and is derived from the input-output matrices compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). More details are in the Appendix.

$$inputhhi_i = \sum_{j=1}^N \left( \frac{E_{ij}}{E_i} \right)^2 \quad \text{where } E_i = \sum_{j=1}^N E_{ij}$$

where  $E_{ij}$  is the amount of input sourced by industry  $i$  from industry  $j$ . The industry distinction is at the 4-digit NAICS level. A negative sign is added so that a high  $inputhhi$  corresponds with an industry more reliant on contract enforcement (higher input specificity). Higher HHI of inputs corresponds to firms with lower contract reliance. Therefore, for the measure of contract reliance I use,  $contint = -\log(inputhhi)$ .

The regression specification,

$$y_{jst} = \beta_{bp} \cdot (Ban \times Post) + \beta_{ebp} \cdot (Elect \times Ban \times Post) + \beta_{bhp} \cdot (Ban \times Contract \times Post) + \beta_{ebhp} \cdot (Elect \times Ban \times Contract \times Post) + \mathcal{I}(Elect, Ban, Contract, Post) + \delta_s + \delta_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jst} \quad (8)$$

where  $\mathcal{I}(Elect, Ban, Contract, Post)$  includes all the 2 and 3 term interactions between the variables, except for those mentioned in Equation (8). The contract reliance variable is  $Contract = \mathbb{1}(contint > med_{contint})$ . The coefficients on the variables,  $\{Ban \times Post, Elect \times Ban \times Post, Ban \times Post \times Contract, Elect \times Ban \times Post \times Contract\}$  allow us to quantify the heterogeneous average treatment effects.

Table (9) provides the estimation results for the above specification. It is more important to compute the treatment effects of interest based on the above specification. First, I define the different quantities of interest and then later in Table (10), I test whether the effect of a relaxed funding constraint has a heterogeneous effect on sectors.

Table 9: Heterogeneous Effect due to reliance on Contract Enforcement

Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (8). Columns (1)-(4) show results with Labor Productivity in 1000 USD per worker, logarithm of Capital Expenditure, measured in USD 1000s, logarithm of Employment, Revenue per input material cost, and Wage measured in USD 1000 per worker as dependent variables. Variables *Elect* indicates states with judicial elections for state supreme court judges, *Ban* indicates the states that had imposed a ban on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Variable *Contract* indicates sectors with high reliance on contract enforcement. All regressions include state, sector-by-year fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Sector is defined at the 4-digit NAICS code level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Lab Prod (USD/emp)	log(CapEx)	log(Emp)	Rev/Mat. Cost	Wage (USD/emp)
Ban × Post	-21.23 (25.64)	0.48* (0.29)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.13 (0.10)	0.57 (1.02)
Elect × Ban × Post	40.18 (30.53)	-0.10 (0.38)	0.02 (0.04)	0.28** (0.11)	-0.99 (1.27)
Ban × Post × Contract	22.72 (18.65)	-0.21 (0.18)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.59 (0.72)
Elect × Ban × Post × Contract	-18.91 (24.11)	0.09 (0.25)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.08)	1.48 (0.94)
State × Sector FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sector × Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State Time Trend	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	38,536	38,536	38,536	33,779	38,536
R-sq.	0.71	0.63	0.98	0.67	0.73

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The average treatment effect of interest, The  $2 \times 2$  differences in difference estimand for the effect on some real outcome of the relaxation of electoral funding restrictions due to the 2010 FEC ruling. I denote the incumbency advantage conditional on  $\mathbf{X} = (Elect, Contract)$ ,

$$D(\mathbf{X}) = (E[y_{kst}|Ban = 1, Post = 1, \mathbf{X}] - E[y_{kst}|Ban = 1, Post = 0, \mathbf{X}]) \\ - (E[y_{kst}|Ban = 0, Post = 0, \mathbf{X}] - E[y_{kst}|Ban = 0, Post = 0, \mathbf{X}])$$

For example, the average treatment effect on industries that face higher reliance on institutions ( $Contract = 1$ ) of the funding restriction getting relaxed for states without judicial elections is

$$D(\text{no election, Contract Reliant}) = D(Elect = 0, Contract = 1) = \beta_{bhp} + \beta_{bp}$$

Table 10: Treatment Effect Heterogeneity due to reliance on Contract Enforcement

Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (8) and the corresponding treatment effects for different sub-populations. Columns (1)-(4) show results with Labor Productivity in 1000 USD per worker, logarithm of Capital Expenditure, measured in USD 1000s, logarithm of Employment, and Wage measured in USD 1000 per worker as dependent variables. Variables *Elect* indicates states with judicial elections for state supreme court judges, *Ban* indicates the states that had imposed a ban on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Variable *Contract* indicates sectors with high reliance on contract enforcement. All regressions include state, sector-by-year fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Sector is defined at the 4-digit NAICS code level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Lab Prod (USD/emp)	log(CapEx)	log(Emp)	Rev/Mat. Cost	Wage (USD/emp)
D(Contract = 1, Elect = 0)	1.49	0.28	-0.01	-0.11*	-0.02
$\beta_{bhp} + \beta_{bp}$	(0.91)	(0.36)	(0.59)	(0.09)	(0.983)
D(Contract = 0, Elect = 0)	-21.23	0.48	0.03	-0.13	0.57
$\beta_{bp}$	(0.42)	(0.10)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.58)
D(Contract = 1, Elect = 1)	22.75**	0.27	0.03	0.20***	0.47
$\beta_{ebhp} + \beta_{bhp} + \beta_{ebp} + \beta_{bp}$	(0.03)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.00)	(0.44)
D(Contract = 0, Elect = 1)	18.95	0.38	0.04	0.15***	-0.43
$\beta_{ebp} + \beta_{bp}$	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.00)	(0.58)

*p*-values in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table (10) shows how the labor productivity increase is statistically and economically significant for sectors that are more reliant on contract enforcement. Moreover, this increase


is only observed for states that hold judicial elections for high court judge selection. The corresponding effects on physical capital and employment growth rates are also higher for sectors more reliant on contract enforcement. No such heterogeneity in treatment effects is observed for wages indicating that the bargaining power of workers is likely not influencing the increase in labor productivity. Figure (12), estimates Equation (7) on two different sub-samples to highlight the dynamic effect of the change in campaign finance laws on the productivity of contract-intensive and non-contract-intensive sectors. Panels (a) and (b) show the effect on states with judicial elections. Panel (b) confirms that the difference in labor productivity between treated and control states in the post-period is not significantly different than the pre-period difference. Panels (c) and (d) reaffirm our earlier observation that the effect on labor productivity is mainly driven by states with judicial elections.

## 5.1 Effect on Firm Productivity


I use the National Establishments Time-Series (NETS) database compiled by Dun & Bradstreet. The data provides the sales and number of employees for a representative sample at the establishment level. Following, Barnatchez, Crane and Decker (2017), I subset the data as follows. Focus on establishments with  $\geq 10$  and  $\leq 1000$  employees to avoid the effect on imputation on the measurement. I then compute the  $\log(MRPL)$  by equating the sales to the value-added as an approximation. I discard the 1% tails of the  $\log(MRPL)$  at the 4-digit NAICS-year level so as to avoid the effect of outliers in our computations. This gives us 152,198 sector, state, time observations. Finally, I drop all the  $sector \times state \times year$  cells with fewer than 8 establishments so as to reduce noise in the estimation of the first and second moments. I further drop the financial services and insurance sector. I end up with 26,647 sector, state, time (in years) observations. Following Sraer and Thesmar (2023), I focus on 3 independent variables,  $E[\log(MRPL)]$ ,  $V(\log(MRPL))$ , and  $C(\log(MRPL), \log(y))$ . The dispersion of  $MRPL$  is indicative of misallocation within the economy.

Table (11) illustrates how the average labor productivity is higher for the treated states, in line with the evidence presented earlier. Interestingly, it is plausible that the improve-


*Note:* This figure presents the estimation results of equation (7). The dependent variable is labor productivity, measured as USD value added per emp. Panel (a) shows results for states with judicial elections for state Supreme Court judges and Panel (b) for states that use some form of appointment. The figures indicate the coefficients and 90% confidence intervals that illustrate the dynamic effects on labor productivity due to the lifting of the bans imposed on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Event Time, 0 is the year 2010. All estimations include state and sector-by-year fixed effects. Sector is defined at the 4-digit NAICS code level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.




(a) Contract-intensive Sectors in States with Judicial Elections



(b) Non-contract-intensive Sectors in States with Judicial Elections



(c) Contract-intensive Sectors in States without Judicial Elections



(d) Non-contract-intensive Sectors in States without Judicial Elections

Figure 12: Effect on Labor Productivity in USD /emp

Table 11: Effect on size and productivity

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	E[log(MRPL)]	V(log(MRPL))	C(log(MRPL),log(Value))
Ban $\times$ Post	0.03**	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y
Sector FE	Y	Y	Y
N	26,647	26,647	26,647
R-sq.	0.84	0.36	0.25

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$


ment in productivity comes along with higher dispersion in productivity, a measure of factor distortion as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). Column (2) shows that the dispersion in productivity does not increase. Moreover, the increase in productivity is not only for larger firms as shown in Column (3), where the dependent variable is the covariance between labor productivity and revenue. Columns (2) and (3) show that the increased labor productivity is not at the expense of increased misallocation within the economy.

In Figure (13), I replicate the effect of higher labor productivity for sectors with higher contract reliance in states that had their bans invalidated by the Supreme Court ruling in 2010. Panel (a) confirms that there are no pre-treatment trends and that labor productivity is higher for sectors more reliant on contract enforcement for their production.


## 6 Conclusion

In this paper, I show that political finance may increase electoral competition for judges, and lead to a more ideologically diverse judicial bench, which could alleviate contractual

*Note:* This figure presents the estimation results of equation (7). The dependent variable is the logarithm of labor productivity, measured as USD sales worker. Panel (a) shows results for sectors with high contract reliance and Panel (b) for sectors with high contract reliance. The figures indicate the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals that illustrate the dynamic effects on labor productivity due to the lifting of the bans imposed on independent expenditures by unions or corporations, which were rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2010. Event Time, 0 is the year 2010. All estimations include state and sector-by-year fixed effects. Sector is defined at the 4-digit NAICS code level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.



(a) Sectors with High Contract Reliance



(b) Sectors with Low Contract Reliance

Figure 13: Effect on Average Labor Productivity in USD /worker and Dispersion within State-Sector



frictions faced by firms and increase factor productivity. Using the 2010 Supreme Court ruling that rendered bans imposed on independent expenditures by corporations and unions as unconstitutional. As a result, states that had imposed such bans experienced an increase in political financing. First, I document that the Supreme Court ruling led to an increase in political funding of judicial candidates. This increase was mainly driven by funding from businesses and political parties that may have been constrained due to the prior bans. Second, I document that the rise in competition for political finance is also associated with increased competition in judicial races. The number of candidates per judicial seat increased along with the decline in the vote margin of the winners, i.e. the electoral races became more competitive. The incumbency advantage in judicial races also declined significantly. I further show that the increased political finance is associated with higher productivity of labor, particularly in states that have judicial elections. I then show the link between the removal of bans on political finance and higher labor distortion is particularly strong for sectors more reliant on contract enforcement and in states with judicial elections. Finally, I provide some suggestive evidence that the higher labor productivity seems to be operating through the political expenditures in judicial elections and the ideological diversity of the bench and does not come at the expense of higher factor misallocation.

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## A Appendix: Exogenous Treatment Assignment

Below I document, how the removal of bans is uncorrelated with crucial state-level characteristics and the dependent variables in the pre-period.

Table 12: Covariate Balance

	Mean (Treated)	Mean (Control)	Diff.	<i>p</i> -value
Pres. Total Votes	3,486,586	2,109,254	-1,377,333	(0.14)
Pres. Dem. Vote Share	49.3	48.4	-.98	(0.77)
Gov. Dem. Vote Share	49.3	43.5	-5.8	(0.29)
Median Ideology (PAJID)	32.99	48.06	-15.07	(0.16)
Mean Ideology (PAJID)	40.39	45.71	-5.31	(0.48)
Real GDP (in USD MM)	379,940	235,787	-144,153	(0.27)
Labor Income (in USD MM)	191,610	118,616	-72,994	(0.24)
Mean Income (HH)	60,662	60,593	-70	(0.98)
Median Income (HH)	45,983	45,119	-863	(0.72)
Fraction above 200k	2.55	2.69	.14	(0.70)
Fraction below 10k	8.07	8.82	.75	(0.27)
No. of HH	3,014,342	1,852,805	-1,161,537	(0.19)
Population above 18	6,035,970	3,754,700	-2,281,270	(0.22)
Prct HS grad	31.6	29.4	-2.2	(0.21)
Prct Bachelors	23.4	22.4	-1.1	(0.51)

## B Appendix: Contract Reliance


in this section, I show the results of the computations of the contract reliance measure described in the main text. I supplement the measure with another measure, the input Gini. All the results in the main text are robust to both measures. The *inputgini* is defined as,

$$inputgini_i = \frac{2}{N+1} \sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{k=1}^j \frac{E_{ik}}{E_i}$$


where  $E_{ik}$  are arranged in an ascending order and  $E_i = \sum_{k=1}^N E_{ik}$ . The higher the gini, the higher is the input specificity.

Least Contract Intensive			Most Contract Intensive		
Sr.No	NAICS	Industry	Sr.No	NAICS	Industry
1	324	Petroleum and coal products manufacturing	1	3391	Medical equipment and supplies manufacturing
2	3116	Animal slaughtering and processing	2	23	Construction
3	3252	Resin, synthetic rubber, and artificial synthetic fibers and filaments manufacturing	3	42	Wholesale trade
4	3311	Iron and steel mills and ferroalloy manufacturing	4	3333	Commercial and service industry machinery manufacturing, including digital camera manufacturing
5	3315	Foundries	5	3274, 3279	Lime, gypsum and other nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing
6	3115	Dairy product manufacturing	6	213	Support activities for mining
7	3251	Basic chemical manufacturing	7	323	Printing and related support activities
8	3361	Motor vehicle manufacturing	8	3271	Clay product and refractory manufacturing
9	3313	Alumina and aluminum production and processing	9	445	Food and beverage stores
10	3117	Seafood product preparation and packaging	10	3351	Electric lighting equipment manufacturing

Table 13: Least and Most Contract Reliant Industries



(a) Density HHI inputs



(b) Density Gini inputs

Figure 14: Density of Contract intensity measures

	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	$\rho_{gini}$
Input HHI	0.136	0.107	0.096	0.038	0.623	-0.780
Levchenko (2007)	0.133	0.093		0.035	0.780	-0.742

Table 14: Summary Statistics of Input HHI

## B.1 Pre Trends: Contract Reliant vs. Non-contract Reliant industries








Figure 15: Relationship between Contract intensity Measures




(a) Non-contract reliant Capex Pre-Trends




(b) Contract Reliant Capex Pre-Trends

Figure 16: Pre-Trends Capex




(a) Non-contract reliant Labor Productivity  
Pre-Trends




(b) Contract Reliant Labor Productivity  
Pre-Trends

Figure 17: Pre-Trends Labor Productivity




(a) Non-contract reliant MRPL Pre-Trends




(b) Contract Reliant MRPL Pre-Trends

Figure 18: Pre-Trends MRPL


## C Effect of Political Finance on High-Contract Reliant Sector




(a) Capital Expenditure



(b) Employment



(c) Labor Productivity



(d)  $\log(MRPL)$

Figure 19: Event Study with event time 2010 (Time = 0) for industries with higher reliance on contract enforcement (input specificity).

## D Appendix: Judicial Funding and Disclosures




Figure 20: Density of  $\log(\text{Fund})$

### D.0.1 Effect of Union vs. Corporate

Some states banned independent expenditures from corporations, while some states banned independent expenditures from both unions and corporations. Assuming **constant treatment effect** of unions (and similarly for corporations), I can check whether the corporation ban bites more vs. the union ban. In Table (16), the coefficient on *treatcorppost* captures the additional funding in states that imposed a corporation-only ban, relative to states with no bans. Similarly, the coefficient on *treatunionpost* captures the additional funding in states that imposed a ban on both, *corp + unions*. The difference between the two coefficients, allows us to compute the average treatment effect due to union bans.

Table 15: Within Elections Correlation

	Business	Lawyers and Lobbyists	Unassigned	Party and Cand.	Union and other
Business	1.000				
Lawyers and Lobbyists	0.127*** (0.000)	1.000			
Unassigned	0.351*** (0.000)	0.314*** (0.000)	1.000		
Party and Cand.	0.050* (0.073)	0.130*** (0.000)	0.473*** (0.000)	1.000	
Union and other	0.070** (0.012)	0.504*** (0.000)	0.275*** (0.000)	0.233*** (0.000)	1.000

*p*-values in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$


Table 16: Effect due to Corporations and Union bans

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Fund (in MM)	Fund (in MM)	Ind. Exp. (in MM)	Ind. Exp. (in MM)
treat x post	0.22** (0.10)		0.30** (0.13)	
corp ban ( $\beta_c$ )		0.07 (0.08)		0.22* (0.12)
corp + union ban ( $\beta_{cu}$ )		0.31** (0.11)		0.31** (0.13)
F [ $H_0: \beta_{cu} - \beta_c = 0$ ]		6.69		0.34
$p$ -value		0.02		0.57
Cycle FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Incumbency FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,227.00	1,227.00	251.00	251.00
Rsqr.	0.27	0.27	0.36	0.36
F	3.85	3.74	6.82	13.15

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The candidate funding is not affected by the corporations-only ban being lifted. Moreover, the difference between the two coefficients is significant at the 10% confidence level. Therefore, this evidence points to higher funding of candidates in states where there is a higher increase in competition for electoral funding. These results are mainly driven by uncoded funding contributions. For business, or union spending this difference is insignificant. That is, only for uncoded funding I observe that the union + corporate ban has a higher funding effect than the corporate ban alone. On the other hand, the independent expenditures are higher for both treatments. The difference between the coefficients that captures the effect of the union ban being lifted, is not statistically significant at the 10% level. In fact, the  $p$  value is 0.68. This evidence points to higher independent expenditures mainly driven by states which imposed bans on corporations.



(a) Funding Unions Effect

(b) Funding Corporate Effect

Figure 21: Event study plots. Event time is the 2010-2011 election cycle.

## D.1 Judicial Competition

I run a linear probability model where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1, if an incumbent emerges as a winner in a race with challengers. The baseline is that an incumbent wins in 33% of the races. However, this advantage declined by 20% after the Supreme Court ruling in states affected by the lifting of the bans.



Table 17: Effect on Independent Spending (Categorized)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Unassigned	Union and other	Ideology	Business	Party and Cand.
treat x post	0.24*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	0.17 (0.12)	0.10 (0.10)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Cycle FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Incumbency FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	214.00	214.00	214.00	214.00	214.00
Rsqr.	0.43	0.12	0.28	0.15	0.39
F	14.90	0.92	2.66	8.40	17.08

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## A Online Appendix

### A.1 Judicial Selection



Figure 22: wellustration of an advertisement for Judge Janet Protasiewicz (indirect Expenditure)

Table 18: Incumbent's advantage

	(1)	(2)
	incumb. win	incumb. win
treat	-0.15 (0.13)	
post	0.23** (0.09)	
treat x post	-0.19* (0.10)	-0.20** (0.10)
Constant	0.55*** (0.14)	0.33*** (0.06)
Cycle FE	N	Y
State FE	N	Y
Elect. type FE	Y	Y
Observations	445.00	444.00
Rsq.	0.17	0.45
F	11.42	2.74

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

METHODS OF SELECTION AND RETENTION FOR  
HIGHEST COURT BY STATE<sup>48</sup>

State	Selection Method for Full Term	Retention Method	State	Selection Method for Full Term	Retention Method
Alabama	P	P	Montana	N	N
Alaska	M	R	Nebraska	M	R
Arizona	M	R	Nevada	N	N
Arkansas	P	P	New Hampshire <sup>49</sup>	G	-
California	G	R	New Jersey <sup>50</sup>	G	G
Colorado	M	R	New Mexico	P	R
Connecticut <sup>51</sup>	LA	LA	New York	M	G
Delaware	M	G	North Carolina	P	P
Florida	M	R	North Dakota	N	N
Georgia	N	N	Ohio <sup>52</sup>	N	N
Hawaii	M	J	Oklahoma	M	R
Idaho	N	N	Oregon	N	N
Illinois	P	R	Pennsylvania	P	R
Indiana	M	R	Rhode Island <sup>53</sup>	M	-
Iowa	M	R	South Carolina	LE	LE
Kansas	M	R	South Dakota	M	R
Kentucky	N	N	Tennessee	M	N
Louisiana <sup>54</sup>	P	P	Texas	P	P

<sup>48</sup> The data in this table were collected from ROTTMAN ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 21 tbl.4, and the American Judicature Society, *supra* note 41. G = gubernatorial appointment or reappointment, P = partisan election or reelection, N = nonpartisan election or reelection, LA = legislative appointment or reappointment, LE = legislative election or reelection, M = merit plan, R = retention election, and J = reappointment by a judicial nominating commission.

<sup>49</sup> In New Hampshire, judges serve until age seventy. ROTTMAN ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 28 tbl.4.

<sup>50</sup> In New Jersey, after an initial gubernatorial reappointment, judges serve until age seventy. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 3.

<sup>51</sup> In Connecticut, the governor nominates, and the legislature appoints. ROTTMAN ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 21 tbl.4, 25 n.2.

<sup>52</sup> In Ohio, political parties nominate candidates to run in nonpartisan elections. Am. Judicature Soc'y, *supra* note 41.

<sup>53</sup> In Rhode Island, judges have life tenure. ROTTMAN ET AL., *supra* note 40, at 28 tbl.5.

<sup>54</sup> In Louisiana, candidates compete in a blanket primary with party labels on the ballot. The top two primary candidates go on to the general election. Am. Judicature Soc'y, *supra* note 41.

Figure 23: Judge Selection Procedures Kang and Shepherd (2015).

TABLE 1 CONTINUED

State	Selection Method for Full Term	Retention Method	State	Selection Method for Full Term	Retention Method
Maine	G	G	Utah	M	R
Maryland	M	R	Vermont	M	LE
Massachusetts <sup>55</sup>	M	-	Virginia	LE	LE
Michigan <sup>56</sup>	N	N	Washington	N	N
Minnesota	N	N	West Virginia	P	P
Mississippi	N	N	Wisconsin	N	N
Missouri	M	R	Wyoming	M	R

Figure 24: Judge Selection Procedures Kang and Shepherd (2015).




Figure 25: States that imposed bans on independent expenditure. Figure from Klumpp, Mialon and Williams (2016)




Figure 26: 2 Partisan/Non-partisan Elections

## A.2 Data Coverage

This section provides information on the matching procedures used in the study to compile the sample for the analysis. The step-by-step guide aids in the replication of results presented in the study.




Figure 27: Judges Political Funding data coverage